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CASENOTE
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal
Criminal Law: The Assassination of
Congressman Ryan
United States v. Layton
509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.Cal. 1981)
On November 18, 1978, United States Congressman Leo J.
Ryan was murdered, and United States Deputy Chief of Mission
Richard Dwyer wounded, in the Republic of Guyana. The two were
investigating reports that members of a commune of the People's
Temple, a religious cult established by Jim Jones, were being held
against their will. The assassination of the Congressman triggered
the mass suicide at Jonestown, Guyana, in which more than 900
members of the cult died. Lawrence J. Layton, a citizen of the
United States and one of Jones' closest aides, was the only person
left alive who was implicated in the crime.1
Layton was jailed for two years in Guyana where he was tried
and acquitted of the murders of two cult defectors under the crimi-
nal laws of that nation.2 Later, charges against him for the assassi-
nation of Congressman Ryan were dropped by Guyanese officials
since all the witnesses had left the country." Despite the absence of
an extradition treaty,4 the Guyanese Government cooperated in
transferring Layton to the jurisdiction of the United States, where
he was indicted on four criminal counts: (1) conspiracy to murder
Congressman Ryan under 18 U.S.C. § 351(d); (2) aiding and abet-
ting in his murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), 2; (3) conspiracy to
murder Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Dwyer - an internation-
ally protected person - under 18 U.S.C. § 1117; and (4) aiding and
abetting in his attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 2.6
Defendant Layton moved to dismiss the indictment on the
1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1979, at 49, col. 4.
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at 16, col. 6.
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1979, at 49, col. 4.
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1979, at 22, col 1.
5. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D.Cal. 1981).
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ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the underlying events had occurred in a foreign territory.6 In deny-
ing this motion, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held that extraterritorial jurisdiction was im-
plicit in the respective statutes and that there was proper subject
matter jurisdiction over all counts of the indictment.' United
States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.Cal. 1981).
This Note examines the historical and legal background
against which the Layton opinion was written. It concludes with an
analysis of the court's decision and of the underlying policy consid-
erations involved in the extraterritorial application of federal crim-
inal law.
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND
AMERICAN LAW
International law recognizes five principles of legislative juris-
diction over criminal acts: (1) territorial and objective territorial-
ity, (2) protective, (3) nationality, (4) passive personality, and (5)
universality.8 In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court cited all but the universality principle as authority for exer-
cising concurrent jurisdiction over the events that transpired in
Guyana.9
The territorial principle was firmly established in American
jurisprudence by Chief Justice Marshall when he stated: "The ju-
risdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute."10 Article 3 of the Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, Part II: Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime states:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in
whole or in part within its territory.
This jurisdiction extends to
(a) any participation outside its territory in a crime commit-
ted in whole or in part within its territory; and
(b) any attempt outside its territory to commit a crime in
6. Id. at 215.
7. Id. at 212. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the defendant's petition was dismissed as a nonreviewable interlocutory order. United
States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1981).
8. Harvard Research in International Law, Part II: Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research].
9. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
10. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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whole or in part within its territory."
Article 3 also embodies the principle of objective territoriality,
by extending the territorial principle to acts committed outside a
state that are intended to produce and that do produce harmful
effects within its boundaries." The Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States permits a state to ex-
tend jurisdiction over such acts if:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constit-
uent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that
have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the con-
duct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems."
The objective territorial principle has been firmly endorsed by
American courts in cases where the defendant is a United States
national. 4
The protective principle is defined in the Restatement in the
following terms:
11. Harvard Research, supra, note 8, at 480.
12. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) for a description of this principle.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RzLATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
(hereinafter cited as REsTATEmENT].
14. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1931); Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280, 285 (1911); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1908). A
more difficult question of jurisdiction arises, however, when the defendant is an alien. There
is currently a conflict among the federal courts on this subject, but the prevailing trend is in
favor of exercising jurisdiction over an alien accused of causing harmful effects within the
United States. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, sub.
nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (Canadian conspiracy to smuggle heroin
into the United States); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (antitrust violations alleged against a foreign corporation); contra United States v.
Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (alien held not subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States for falsifying and concealing a material fact to the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service).
British citizens were held subject to American jurisdiction by the Supreme Court for
conspiracy to illegally import liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The action,
however, was pursuant to a treaty between the two nations authorizing such jurisdiction,
and is an isolated example of the Court's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens.
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 609, 618 (1927).
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(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threat-
ens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental
functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a
crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (1) includes in particular
the counterfeiting of the state's seals and currency, and the fal-
sification of its official documents.' "
The protective principle differs from objective territoriality in
two significant respects. First, it applies only to acts that threaten
a country's security or directly interfere with its governmental
functions, not to acts against private persons.' Second, no actual
effect need take place within a state's boundaries: a potentially ad-
verse effect will suffice.' 7 Although the Supreme Court of the
United States has not cited the protective principle of interna-
tional law as authority for exercising American jurisdiction over
aliens for acts committed against the United States from abroad,
several lower federal courts have invoked it under these
circumstances."s
The nationality principle is recognized by both the Supreme
Court of the United States" and under international law.20 The
conduct of a citizen, regardless of where it takes place, is subject to
the legislative jurisdiction of the state of nationality "by virtue of
the obligations of citizenship."
15. RESTATEmENT, supra, note 13, § 33,
16. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
17. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. Id.; United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D.Cal 1960), aff'd sub.
nom., Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.Cal. 1943); contra United States v.
Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also Gareia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon
Foreign Territory, 19 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 567, 578 (1958); Swigert, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion of Criminal Law, 13 HAnv. INT'L L. J. 34, 348 n,4 (1972).
19. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
20. The RESTATEmENT reads:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wher-
ever the conduct occurs or
(b) as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national, wherever
the thing or other subject matter to which the interest relates is located.
RESTATEMENT, supra, note 13, § 30.
21. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932).
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A principle of international law enjoying less acceptance is
passive personality, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality of the victim rather than the offender. This principle
has little support in American case law' s and has been specifically
rejected by the Restatement.' 3
The universality principle applies to a limited number of in-
ternational crimes and bases jurisdiction simply upon physical cus-
tody of the offender, regardless of nationality or the location of the
crime.2 4 Crimes that may be prosecuted under this principle in-
clude the slave trade, traffic in women or drugs, war crimes and
terrorism.25
Unlike some civil law countries that have incorporated all five
principles of international law in their penal codes,s the United
States courts have followed the common law tradition of limiting
extraterritorial jurisdiction of federal criminal law fairly strictly to
offenses that fall under the principles of nationality and terri-
toriality.17 Such self-restraint, however, is not constitutionally
mandated.28
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Cur-
tiss- Wright Export Corp.," recognized an "inherent power" in for-
eign affairs that passed directly to the federal government from the
British Crown as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty. The
Court held that this power, unlike internal sovereignty, is not de-
pendent upon affirmative grants of power in the Constitution. In-
stead, it exists separate and apart in the same manner and to the
same extent as when held by the Crown "save in so far as the Con-
stitution in express terms qualifies its exercise. '"" The exercise of
external sovereignty is governed then, not by the Constitution, but
by "treaties, international compacts, and the principles of interna-
tional law." 1
22. 509 F. Supp. at 216, n.5.
23. "A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals." RESTATEMENT, supra, note 13, § 30 (2) comment e.
24. RESTATEMENT, supra, note 13, § 34 comment b, illustration 2.
25. Id.; 509 F. Supp. at 223.
26. Swigert, supra, note 18, at 347.
27. Garcia-Mora, supra, note 18, at 569; Swigert, supra, note 18, at 347.
28. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 317.
31. Id. at 318. For an alternate theory of congressional authority based upon express
provisions in the Constitution, see Federal Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed Abroad by
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The practical result of the theory of external sovereignty is
that it "leaves the Congress free to pick and choose principles of
international law"' that it wishes to incorporate into its legisla-
tion, including all five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crimes. However, Congress has seldom made explicit in its legisla-
tion whether a statute was intended to have extraterritorial effect.
Such a determination is often left to the federal courts.5 '
When facts of a case give rise to the need for judicial interpre-
tation concerning the extraterritorial scope of a statute, federal
courts have adhered to a basic canon of construction in keeping
with their reluctance to stray beyond the limits of the territorial
and nationality principles. This policy construes federal criminal
legislation as applicable only within the territorial limits of the
United States in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the con-
trary. 4 Because of the great increase of American involvement in
world affairs,35 however, many statutes have been interpreted to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to fulfill the aims of the
legislation. 6
In an attempt to guide the lower federal courts in determining
whether a statute is to be given extraterritorial effect in a given set
of circumstances, the United States Supreme Court set forth
guidelines of interpretation in United States v. Bowman.'7 The
Court stated:
The necessary locus [for application of a federal statute], when
not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as
evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the
Aliens, 13 STAN. L. RaV. 155, 157 (1960).
32. United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
33. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
34. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1908). "[A]II legislation is
prima facie territorial . . . " Id. at 357; RESTAT zNT, supra, note 13, § 38; compare Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974). "Even the most basic principles of statutory construction must yield to clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent." Id. at 458.
35. Rosenfeld, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. RKv. 1005, 1009 (1976); Swigert, supra, note 18, at 348.
36. United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1974) (counterfeiting statute);
United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973) (statute dealing with theft of govern-
ment property); Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1970) (bankruptcy stat-
ute); see also Rosenfeld, supra, note 35, at 1005-38 (discussion of extraterritorial effect given
to statutes dealing with securities regulation, labor law, antitrust, export controls and envi-
ronmental law).
37. 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (prosecution of Americans allegedly defrauding a government
corporation by acts committed on the high seas and in a foreign country).
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territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a gov-
ernment to punish crime under the law of nations.ss
Whereas crimes against private individuals or property are
prima facie territorial, absent an express provision to the contrary,
the Court held that:
[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to crimi-
nal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on
their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted
because of the right of the government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if commit-
ted by its own citizens, officers, or agents. Some such offenses
can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
government because of the local acts required to constitute
them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in
foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not
thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that
the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but
allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense" (empha-
sis added).
The Bowman test requires that the court first determine
whether the nature of the law itself inherently mandates its extra-
territorial application. If not, a presumption arises against such an
application that may be overcome only if the government demon-
strates a clear expression of congressional intent that the statute
be applied beyond the territory of the United States.40
II. THE LAYTON OPINION
Following the guidelines laid down in Bowman, the Layton
court analyzed the four counts of the indictment to determine if
Congress would have intended the underlying statutes to apply to
the facts of the case. The prerogative of Congress to authorize such
extraterritorial jurisdiction was established under the objective
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id.
40. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); United States v. Mitchell, 553
F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977). For a list of sixteen factors that a court may take into ac-
count in resolving the question of extraterritoriality, see Air Line Stewards and Steward-
esses Association, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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territoriality, nationality, protective and passive personality prin-
ciples of international law.
The first count of the indictment charged Layton with con-
spiracy to kill Congressman Ryan, and the second count charged
him with aiding and abetting in the murder of the legislator. Both
counts were based upon 18 U.S.C. § 351, which provides sanctions
for crimes specifically related to Congressional assassination, kid-
napping and assault. 1 The second count was also based upon 18
U.S.C. § 2, that makes a conspirator in such crimes punishable as a
principal." Neither statute makes any provision for extraterritorial
application.
The court first found that the nature of section 351 inherently
mandates its extraterritorial application because of the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in protecting itself from "obstruction
and fraud."' In support of this finding, the court cited examples
from the statute's legislative history that demonstrated its role as
part of a statutory scheme to protect top officials of government,
thereby assuring the integrity of representative democracy." The
court reasoned that on the basis of prior case law - where extra-
territorial jurisdiction had been ascribed to federal criminal stat-
utes protecting government property and checks - Congress was
certainly "addressing as important a problem threatening the in-
tegrity of the government when it moved to protect Congressmen
from assault and murder.""4
As a second ground for inferring extraterritoriality, the court
41. 18 U.S.C. § 351 reads in part:
(a) Whoever kills any individual who is a Member of Congress or a Member-of-
Congress-elect shall be punished as provided by sections 1111 and 1112 of this
title.
(d) If two or more persons conspire to kill or kidnap any individual designated
in subsection (a) of this section and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished (1) by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life, or (2) by death or imprisonment for any terms
of years or for life, if death results to such individual.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2 states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principle.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principle.
43. 509 F. Supp. at 218; Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97-98.
44. 509 F. Supp. at 218-20; Response of the United States to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Indictment at 14, United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.Cal. 1981).
45. 509 F. Supp. at 218.
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noted that the large increase in international travel by legislators
had rendered them more vulnerable to attack.4 The court found
that failure to give section 351 extraterritorial effect would be
"greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave
open a large immunity for [crimes] as easily committed by citizens
on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.'
The court then went on to consider the fourth count of the
indictment, charging Layton with aiding and abetting the at-
tempted murder of DCM Dwyer - an internationally protected
person - under 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(2).4 s Section 1116 was
amended in 1976 with the addition of subsection (c), pursuant to
American obligations under two multilateral treaties: (1) Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons (U.N. Treaty),4" and (2) Convention to
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of Inter-
national Significance (O.A.S. Treaty).' ° Unlike section 351, subsec-
tion (c) provides section 1116 with a limited grant of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction under the universality principle. Subsection (c)
46. Id. at 219.
47. Id.; Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97-98. The extraterritorial effect of 18 U.S.C. § 2 was
premised upon a finding of extraterritoriality under section 351. 509 F. Supp. at 217 n.6.
48. The fourth count of the indictment was considered before the third since the find-
ing of extraterritoriality under 18 U.S.C. § 1116 forms the basis for finding jurisdiction
under the conspiracy statute - 18 U.S.C. § 1117 - mentioned in the third count. 509 F.
Supp. at 221 n.17.
18 U.S.C. § 1116 reads in part:
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, official guest, or interna-
tionally protected person shall be punished as provided under sections 1111,
1112, and 1113 of this title, except that any such person who is found guilty of
murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and any
such person who is found guilty of attempted murder shall be imprisoned for not
more than twenty years.
DCM Dwyer's characterization as an "internationally protected person" is based upon §
1116(b)(4) that defines such a person in the following terms:
(A) a Chief of State or the political equivalent, head of government or Foreign
Minister whenever such person is in a country other than his own and any mem-
ber of his family accompanying him; or
(B) any other representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States
Government, a foreign government, or international organization who at the
time and place concerned is entitled pursuant to international law to special
protection against attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, and any member
of his family then forming part of his household.
49. 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
50. 27 U.S.T. 1971, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8413. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 was originally enacted in
response to the attack on the Israeli Olympic Team at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich.
United States v. Marcano Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (D.C.P.R. 1978).
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states:
If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an interna-
tionally protected person, the United States may exercise juris-
diction over the offense if the alleged offender is present within
the United States, irrespective of the place where the offense
was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged
offender."1
However, the court found that the jurisdiction provided for by
this section was inapplicable to the case at hand since the defen-
dant was not present within the United States for the purposes of
the statute at the time the indictment was handed down.5" It did
not dismiss the fourth count, however, but proceeded to infer an
expanded grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction under section 1116
based upon article 3 of the U.N. Treaty, explicitly authorizing
three additional grounds of jurisdiction under the territorial, na-
tionality and passive personality principles.53 Although these
principles had not been incorporated into the language of section
1116, the court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to
exclude them given the strong desire evident in a review of the
statute's legislative history to give full legal effect to the treaties."
The court concluded its analysis by finding extraterritorial juris-
diction over the matters alleged in the fourth count under the
principles of nationality and passive personality provided for in
the U.N. Treaty. 5'
The last count of the indictment the court considered - the
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (c).
52. 509 F. Supp. at 221.
53. Article 3 of the U.N. Treaty reads in part:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in article 2 [which includes the crimes pres-
ently subject to this discussion] in the following cases:
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory of that State or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) when the crime is committed against an internationally protected person
. . . who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions which he exercises on
behalf of that State.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures to establish jurisdiction
over these crimes in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory
and it does not extradite him . . . to any of the States mentioned in paragraph
1 of this article.
28 U.S.T. 1975, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
54. 509 F. Supp. at 222-23.
55. Id. at 225.
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third to be handed down - charged Layton with conspiracy to
murder an internationally protected person under 18 U.S.C. §
1117.6 The finding of subject matter jurisdiction under this stat-
ute was dependent upon the court's finding of extraterritoriality in
regard to section 1116.57 Section 1117 makes no provision for ex-
traterritorial application, but the court held that as a statute of
general reference incorporating section 1116 in cases involving con-
spiracy, it incorporated as well any explicit or implicit grant of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction."8 In support of its holding, the court
cited cases where the extraterritorial reach of conspiracy statutes
had been regularly upheld on the basis of a finding that the under-
lying substantive statute - in this case section 1116 - reached
extraterritorial offenses, even though the conspiracy charges came
under a separate section.5 9
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
The difficulties in investigating and prosecuting crimes com-
mitted outside the territorial limits of the United States, especially
where aliens are involved, have understandably caused Congress to
be circumspect in providing for extraterritorial application of crim-
inal statutes. The cooperation of the foreign nation(s) involved,
particularly in obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the defen-
dant(s) where no extradition treaty exists, is often a crucial factor.
Distance, delay, voluntary attendance of foreign witnesses, and the
expense in transporting them also pose formidable difficulties. The
federal courts, by taking it upon themselves to determine the ex-
traterritorial scope of certain statutes, not only must take into ac-
count the same policy considerations, but must also constantly
bear in mind that in so doing they are performing an essentially
legislative function. Thus the method of statutory construction
employed by the courts has necessarily been strict, as is evidenced
in the test set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1117 states:
If two or more persons conspire to violate section 1111, 1114, or 1116 of this
title, and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
57. 509 F. Supp. at 222 n.17.
58. Id. at 225.
59. Id.
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Bowman."
The Layton court faithfully applied the Bowman test in its
finding of subject matter jurisdiction under all four counts of the
indictment. However, the court in large part misapplied the princi-
ples of international law cited as authority for this finding, failing
to properly evaluate and distinguish the policy considerations un-
derlying the application of each one.
The nationality, objective territoriality, passive personality
and protective principles were all cited as authority for the extra-
territorial application of section 351, pertaining to crimes against
Congressmen."" The court's assertion of the last three principles,
while not per se fallacious, only served to blur the important dis-
tinctions among them without aiding in the resolution of the case.
Layton's American nationality provided more than sufficient
justification for the extraterritorial application of section 351
under both domestic and international law. A United States citizen
may not escape the obligations of citizenship-including obser-
vance of criminal statutes-simply by leaving the country. 2 Al-
though a potential conflict might arise if conduct in violation of
American laws also violates the laws of the host nation, the latter
has priority under the territorial principle to try the defendant
under its own legal system, in the absence of a treaty to the con-
trary. This occurred in the case at hand where Layton was not re-
turned to the United States until the Guyanese judicial procedure
had run its course, thereby dispensing with any possible conflict of
concurrent jurisdiction."
60. 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
61. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
62. The Supreme Court in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) stated at 73-74:
Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the gov-
ernment, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is
to be construed as applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas
or in a foreign country though there be no express declaration to that effect.
See also RESTATEMENT, supra, note 13, § 30.
63. In the Response of the United States to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment at 19, United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.Cal. 1981), the govern-
ment stated:
Defendant can cite no Guyanese interest in restricting the exercise of United
States jurisdiction over defendant's crimes in that country. The sovereignty of
that nation is not offended by the prosecution of the offenses in the United
States. Indeed, the Guyana government cooperated in deporting defendant to
the United States to stand trial.
In regard to the potential conflict that assertion of the nationality principle might create
with foreign jurisdictions, the Supreme Court has held that:
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The objective territorial principle, while traditionally cited in
conjunction with nationality as a basis for asserting extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, is not essential to the determination of the case at
hand. It is primarily intended to reach acts committed abroad that
produce effects within the state where those effects are felt by pri-
vate persons.4 The assassination of a Congressman does not pro-
vide an appropriate circumstance for the application of this princi-
ple. It is better reserved for the classic case where "A shoots B
across the border", or for the more controversial cases involving
allegations of antitrust violations against alien corporations.6
The protective principle, governing jurisdiction over acts with
a potentially adverse effect on the government, was applied by the
Layton court citing United States v. Pizzarusso.ee Pizzarusso,
however, was not an American, as was Layton, but an alien who
had knowingly made false statements under oath in a visa applica-
tion to an American official. The primary purpose behind the pro-
tective principle is to reach aliens who would not otherwise be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the government under the nationality
principle.
Use of the protective principle in circumstance% other than
those enumerated in the Restatement 7 involves serious considera-
tions of potential infringement of the sovereignty of foreign na-
tions, since what may be viewed in one country as subversive acts
against its government may be viewed in another as completely le-
gitimate forms of political expression." Although such fears are
unwarranted in the Layton case since both countries condemned
the murder of Congressman Ryan, in other circumstances use of
the protective principle could open a Pandora's box of penal sanc-
The United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from gov-
erning the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign coun-
tries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. With
respect to such exercise of authority, there is no question of international law,
but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the
citizen in relation to his own government.
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941); see also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922).
64. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
65. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968).
67. See infra text at 64.
68. "[I]t may be confidently asserted that the United States is not well disposed to
prosecute foreigners for politically hostile acts committed in foreign territory." Garcia-Mora,
supra, note 18, at 578.
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tions against political acts redefined as criminal in another state's
legal lexicon.
The passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction by
reference to the nationality of the victim, was invoked by the court
on the basis of Congressman Ryan's American citizenship. Al-
though the assertion of this principle is more on point and may
help it to gain a firmer foothold in American case law, the court
recognized in a footnote that standing alone, it might not be ade-
quate." In any event, its assertion is of little moment given the
much stronger basis for jurisdiction found under the nationality
principle. As in the case of the protective principle, passive per-
sonality might be better reserved for use in cases involving aliens,
immune from jurisdiction under the principle of nationality. Re-
straint is also well advised in the assertion of passive personality,
lest countries come to penalize and enforce sanctions against con-
troversial acts committed against their citizens abroad, as in the
case of expropriation.
Although the Layton court went to great pains to substantiate
its finding of subject matter jurisdiction under all four principles,
it also stressed that the violation of section 351 was allegedly com-
mitted by an American citizen against a Congressman acting in his
official capacity.70 This emphasis effectively limited the holding of
the case to these facts, and established the nationality principle as
the only real authority relied upon, despite the court's dicta to the
contrary. The government, however, contended that section 351
should not be so limited, and that it should also apply to aliens
accused of crimes committed abroad against Congressmen,"1 re-
gardless of whether they are acting in their official capacity.2 This
interpretation seems the more valid, since to limit the application
of section 351 to crimes committed by American nationals cer-
tainly would be "greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute"'"7 by undermining its protection of Congressmen in their
travels abroad. The protection guaranteed to Congressmen by sec-
tion 351 may not be logically restricted to acts by Americans if
legislative intent is to be vindicated.7 4 Its application to aliens can
69. 509 F. Supp. at 216 n.5.
70. Id. at 219-20.
71. Response of the United States to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 11,
United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
72. Brief for Appellee, at 16 n.16, United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1981).
73. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
74. During the deliberations over passage of the statute, Senator Byrd articulated the
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be upheld under the authority of both the passive personality and
protective principles of international law, given that the murder of
a congressman is a crime against a United States national having
adverse effects upon the security and functions of the American
government. Application of these principles would not be a matter
of controversy with foreign jurisdictions, since the murder of a gov-
ernment representative is recognized in the Restatement as a crime
"under the laws of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
75
Assertion of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over
aliens in such circumstances under the passive personality and
protective principles should not be precluded simply because there
may be greater likelihood of conflict with foreign jurisdictions than
would be the case if the defendant is an American national. Nor
should it preclude a request on the part of the American govern-
ment that a foreign jurisdiction extradite an alien defendant,
whether by treaty or as an act of policy. The fact that a foreign
government may not always be inclined to submit one of its na-
tionals or a national of a third state to United States jurisdiction
should not by itself determine the scope of legislation designed to
protect the integrity of the American government.
The Layton court's endeavor to find alternate grounds of ju-
risdiction under section 1116 for the crimes allegedly committed
against DCM Dwyer was unnecessary since the universality princi-
ple was the proper authority. This principle was rejected by the
court because of a questionable reading of subsection (c) of section
1116 that states:
If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an interna-
tionally protected person, the United States may exercise juris-
diction over the offense if the alleged offender is present within
the United States, irrespective of the place where the offense
was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged
offender (emphasis added).76
Since Layton was not present in the United States when the
indictment was handed down, the court found that jurisdiction
purpose of section 351 in the following language: "This legislation is intended to protect
representative democracy. Passage would help guarantee the right of any Member of Con-
gress to fulfill his constitutional duties and responsibilities as an elected official of our coun-
try." 116 CONG. Rc. 35,655 (1970).
75. See infra text at 64.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 ().
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under the universality principle embodied in this subsection was
precluded. However, there is nothing in the language of the statute
itself that indicates an indictment should be barred prior to the
offender's return to the United States. Jurisdiction was not en-
forced while the defendant was abroad, but upon his return. The
"presence clause" relates only to a government's obligation to pros-
ecute or extradite an offender under the U.N. Treaty if he or she
should happen to be caught in that country, and is a grant of
subject matter jurisdiction, not a limitation of in personam
jurisdiction.77
It would have been far preferable to assert extraterritoriality
under the principle of universality since it alone was expressly in-
corporated into the language of section 1116 by the Congress. Acts
of terrorism against internationally protected persons are universal
in character, having no regard for territorial boundaries. It is only
through the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over such
crimes that their curtailment may be achieved. In cases where a
state has no relation to either the defendant or to the crime, extra-
dition is the more expedient course. In the Layton case, however,
American jurisdiction under the universality principle was mani-
festly appropriate for both reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question left open by the holding of the Layton decision
- whether an alien may be subject to American jurisdiction under
section 351 for crimes committed abroad against a United States
Congressman - has been answered in the affirmative by section
208 of the proposed new Federal Criminal Code, now before Con-
gress."8 It is the role of the legislature, not the judiciary, to deter-
mine the extraterritorial scope of federal penal statutes, since their
application outside the boundaries of the United States involves
international political considerations outside a court's competence
to decide. If Congress continues to defer this responsibility to the
77. Brief for Appellee at 13, United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1981). In its
brief on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the government argued that the district court also
ignored the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3238 that provides that an indictment "may be filed in
the district of the last known residence of the offender" if the offense was committed
outside the jurisdiction of any particular state or district and if the offender has not been
arrested or brought into any district. Thus, in the government's view, section 3238 would
permit an indictment for offenses committed abroad while a defendant remains outside of
the United States.
78. Swigert, supra, note 18 at 349.
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federal courts, they will have no choice but to apply the Bowman
test and attempt to divine legislative intent and purpose to the
best of their ability. In so doing, however, great care should be
taken to properly distinguish and assert the five principles of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction under international law, lest their author-
ity becomes blurred and lose its impact.
7
'
DAVID W. MILLS
79. The jury trial commenced on August 18, 1981, but after it became clear that the
jury would be unable to reach a verdict on any of the four counts, the District Court for the
Northern District of California declared a mistrial on September 26, 1981. The government
is now going forward with a retrial. United States v. Layton, No. 80-416 (N.D.Ca. Jan. 11,
1982).
